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Rethinking the Guidelines:
A Call for Cooperation
Donald P. Layt
As Clover looked down the hillside her eyes filled with tears. If she
could have spoken her thoughts, it would have been to say that this
was not what they had aimed at .... [I]t was not for this that she and
all the other animals had hoped and toiled.
- George Orwell1
The advent of the federal sentencing guidelines and the creation of the
United States Sentencing Commission (Commission) has spawned hundreds of
writings2-most in protest, few in praise. Professor Dan Freed has now pro-
duced, in my judgment, one of the most objective analyses to date. As a
studied observer of the judicial system, he shows a remarkable understanding
of past and present sentencing structures. Commissioners, judges, and most
importantly, Congress should heed the lessons of his painstaking analysis. As
Professor Freed's article suggests, the imposition of rigid guidelines by an
administrative agency on a sentencing system is destined to failure.
Although Professor Freed and others have offered much constructive
criticism, my greatest concern is that Congress and the Commission itself will
maintain their present attitude that nothing is wrong. The Commission, dignified
by the important role delegated to it, appears to feel largely immune from
t Judge Lay was Chief Judge of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit from January 1980
to January 1992. He is now a U.S. Senior Circuit Judge.
1. GEORGE ORWELL, ANIMAL FARM 97-98 (Harcourt Brace 1954).
2. See, e.g., FED. COURTS STUDY COMM., REPORr OF THE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY CoAMIrTEE 135-43
(1990); G. Thomas Eisele, The Sentencing Guidelines System? No. Sentencing Guidelines? Yes., FED.
PROBATION, Dec. 1991, at 16; Letter from Judge Lawrence K. Karlton, E.D. Cal., to Editors, Federal
Sentencing Reporter (Nov. 20, 1991), in 4 FED. SENTENCING REP. 186 (1991); Eugene D. Natali, The
Probation Officer, Bean Counting and Truth in Sentencing, 4 FED. SENTENCING REP. 102 (1991); Recom-
mendations of the Judicial Conference of the United States to the U.S. Sentencing Comm'n, in 3 FED.
SENTENCING REP. 282 (1991); Wflliam W. Schwarzer, JudicialDiscretion in Sentencing, 3 FED. SENTENCING
REP. 339 (1991); Jose A. Cabranes, Sentencing Guidelines: A Dismal Failure, N.Y. L., Feb. 11, 1992,
at 2. But cf. Edward R. Becker, Flexibility and Discretion Available to the Sentencing Judge Under the
Guidelines Regime, FED. PROBATION, Dec. 1991, at 10; Andrew J. Kleinfeld, The Sentencing Guidelines
Promote Truth and Justice, FED. PROBATION, Dec. 1991, at 16.
3. Daniel 3. Freed, Federal Sentencing in the Wake of Guidelines: Unacceptable Limits on the
Discretion of Sentencers, 101 YALE LJ. 1681 (1992).
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criticism I sense that this attitude emanates in part from the Commissioners'
misguided reading of their alleged statutory mandate to impose a rigid and
harsh sentencing structure without regard to the human cost.5 Although they
may not intend to do so, some of the Commissioners display little empathy or
compassion for offenders as people. They convey a totalitarian mindset reminis-
cent of a bygone era. As Professor Freed notes, the Commission has rejected
constructive criticism from the bench, preferring instead "to show how tough
an administrative agency can be in the face of consumer opposition, even when
the consumers are Article III judges."
On the other hand, Congress seldom reacts to analytical criticism, preferring
instead to focus on politically expedient action. For example, in response to the
Judicial Conference recommendation that mandatory minimum sentences be
repealed,7 Congress enacted legislation providing for additional mandatory
minimum guidelines The Judicial Conference is the policymaking body of
the federal judiciary, and it speaks with a unified and experienced voice in
problems affecting it.
4. See, e.g., William W. Wilkins, Jr., Observations on Judge Heaney's Study, 4 FED. SENTENCING REP.
145 (1991).
5. This belief is based on the historical fable that the guidalines were authorized to remove all disparity
in sentencing, and that, with the passage of the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 (SRA), the sentencing
judge's traditional flexibility and discretion were congressionally repealed. Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1987
(codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 3551-3559, 3561-3566, 3571-3574, 3581-3586 (1988); 28 U.S.C. §§ 991-998
(1988)). This view entirely misreads the legislative history of the SRA. The Senate Judiciary Committee
report emphatically rejected a "mechanistic" role for courts: "The purpose of the sentencing guidelines is
to provide a structure for evaluating the fairness and apprcpriateness of the sentence of an individual
offender, not to eliminate the thoughtful imposition of individualized sentences." S. REP. No. 225, 98th
Cong., 1st Sess. 52 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3235. Professor Freed points out that the
Commission's early observations on this point were consistent with the congressional goal of guiding, not
eradicating, judicial discretion: "[The Commission's] departure policy generously allowed a sentencer to
decide when the guidelines did not fit the needs of a case: 'The controlling decision as to whether and to
what extent departure is warranted can only be made by the courts."' Freed, supra note 3, at 1703 (quoting
U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5K2.0 (1992)).
6. Freed, supra note 3, at 1720.
7. Judicial Conference Resolution (Mar. 13, 1990), reprinted in U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, SPECIAL
REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: MANDATORY MINIMUM PENALTIES IN THE FEDERAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM,
at G-1 to G-3 (1991).
The operation of these sentencing "floors" is draconian. For example, in a recent case in our court,
an 18-year-old man with no prior criminal record was convicted for possession of drugs under 21 U.S.C.
§§ 841, 846 (1988). In exchange for $500, the defendant had agreed to receive a package of drugs through
the mail for his friend, and to later return the package to his friend. Upon conviction he received a
mandatory minimum sentence of 10 years. In dissent, I wrote:
I add one other commentary. This case involves :he conviction of an eighteen-year-old
youth, without any prior criminal experience, who made a serious mistake of judgment. He now
faces a ten year prison sentence for his immature judgment. If this sentence is carried out, his
life will be ruined. His family is devastated. It is difficult for me to believe [that] Congress[,]
by its mandatory minimum penalty[,I condones such punitive sanction to a young lad of eighteen.
I wonder if Congress knows the injustice it creates by such laws. A civilized society should
protest. The President of the United States should grant clemency.
United States v. Caldweli, 954 F.2d 496, 510 (8th Cir. 1992) (Lay, CJ., dissenting).
8. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, supra note 7, app. A (listing mandatory minimum statutes).
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I. JUDICIAL INACTION
Professor Freed addresses the essential question: What's wrong with the
guidelines? However, I would initially like to add to his discussion on how we
got here. I contend that the fault lies primarily with the federal judiciary.9
The truth is that the federal judiciary, lacking both "the sword" and "the
purse," was asleep at the switch. Although it certainly recognized that the pre-
guideline sentence structure needed reform, I think the judiciary suffered from
a false sense of security. Because sentencing had traditionally been a judicial
prerogative, judges thought that no one would ever have the audacity to deprive
them of sentencing discretion. More importantly-and perhaps as a result-the
federal judiciary essentially ignored the problem until Congress enacted the
Sentencing Reform Act,'0 and it became too late to stop the train.
The judiciary's complacency is understandable. It is not the role of the
federal judges to "legislate" reform; policy reform traditionally belongs in the
hands of Congress. However, there are special reasons, involving separation
of powers and the necessary independence of the judiciary, that ought to press
the judiciary itself to address courts' management problems. Recent legislative
events demonstrate that when judges become apathetic to criticism of their
management policies, legislative remedies are bound to follow. Two recent
congressional intrusions into the traditional sphere of judicial management
illustrate this point. The first occurred when the federal judiciary mistakenly
believed the limits of the Due Process Clause sufficiently prevented protracted
delay in criminal cases in the federal courts. Congress' belief to the contrary
produced the Speedy Trial Act of 1974,11 requiring trial of defendants within
seventy days of indictment. Rigid enforcement of this rule inevitably led to
preoccupation with criminal dockets and resulting delay in civil trials. The next
intrusion was inevitable. Congress passed the Civil Justice Reform Act of
1990,12 requiring the development of plans to reduce civil justice delay and
expense. As Chief Justice Rehnquist stated in an address to the American Bar
Association meeting in February of this year: "[Although] [t]hese delay reduc-
tion plans will ultimately benefit the courts as well as the Bar and litigants ....
They also add additional management constraints, lessening the traditional
freedom of the district judge to manage his or her civil docket." 3
9. This suggestion is not intended to detract from Professor Freed's observation that the Commission
strayed from its original intent, which has been "overwhelmed by the complexity, rigidity, severity,
uniformity, and disproportionality of the guidelines and sentences that followed." Freed, supra note 3, at
1703.
10. Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1987 (1984) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 3551-3559, 3561-
3566, 3571-3574, 3581-3586 (1988); 28 U.S.C. §§ 991-998 (1988)).
11. Pub. L. No. 93-619, 88 Stat. 2076 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 3152-3156, 3161-3174
(1988)).
12. Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5090 (codified at 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 471-482 (West Supp. 1991)).
13. Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, Remarks Before the House of Delegates at the American Bar
Association's Mid-Year Meeting 18 (Feb. 4, 1992) (on file with author).
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The early 1980's saw three important congressional proposals for legislation
affecting the federal judiciary: (1) the increase of federal judicial salaries; (2)
the creation of a National Court of Appeals; and (3) federal guideline sentenc-
ing. Chief Justice Burger supported all three measures. While the Judicial
Conference extensively debated and ultimately supported the increase in judicial
salaries, it neither contributed to nor commented on important legislation on
the National Court of Appeals 14 or guideline sentencing. Those issues were
never even placed on the Judicial Conference agenda.15 This was most unfor-
tunate and the judges of the Conference, including myself, have only ourselves
to blame.
Before the passage of the sentencing guidelines, federal judges recognized
that parole boards were pushing the outer limits of due process. Many parole
board decisions resulted in gross disparity of actual sentences served by individ-
uals sentenced for similar crimes. This created the appearance of arbitrariness
in the sentencing process. Beyond occasional reversals and criticisms, however,
the judiciary did little to effect change.16 It did not realize that its failure to
act could lead to a congressional cure much worse than the disease itself.
Although some judicial councils and individual judges communicated their
concerns about sentencing reform to Congress in the early 1980's,17 the prima-
Recognizing the problem of civil delay caused by abuse of discovery procedure, the Judicial Confer-
ence passed amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requiring pretrial scheduling conferences.
See FED. R. Civ. P. 16(b). If federal judges had enthusiastically implemented this rule as the Conference
intended, the Civil Reform Act might not have been passed. Notwithstanding the mandatory language of
rule 16(b), many federal district judges feel that early scheduling conferences are a waste of time. Several
members of the Judicial Conference supported the passage of 16(b), but insisted that it require the judge
to exercise direct control over the discovery process, precluding local rules that permit magistrate control.
This provision remains the rule's internal weakness.
14. This measure, proposed in various forms, would have created an intermediate court of appeals
between the Supreme Court and the Courts of Appeals. See S. 1529, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982); S. 2035,
97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982). It provided a solution to an imaginary problem, and many opposed its passage
on the ground that it would increase delay and expense in both civil and criminal litigation. See, e.g.,
Leonard H. Becker, Intercircuit Panel Not the Answer to Court's Woes, LEGAL TIMES, July 18, 1983, at
10.
15. In 1981, and again in 1982, I attempted to place the issue of sentencing reform on the agenda of
the Judicial Conference for discussion. Chief Justice Burger twice ruled that I was out of order because the
issue was new business that had not proceeded through the proper committee. There is no question in the
minds of many of the members that discussion of the SRA was not placed on the agenda because the
majority of judges of the Conference in the early 1980's overwhelmingly opposed it.
16. Individual judges probably could have done little more than point out the arbitrariness of parole
board action, which might then have served as a catalyst for legislative or executive reform. See, e.g., Harris
v. Martin, 792 F.2d 52, 55 (3d Cir. 1986) (striking as arbitrary parole board practice of "double counting,"
which justified decision to retain prisoner beyond release range dictated by parole guidelines, using same
factor upon which release range was based); Briggs v. United States Parole Comm'n, 736 F.2d 446, 450
(8th Cir. 1984) (requiring Parole Commission to conform to guidelines or state reasons for departing from
them); Grattan v. Sigler, 525 F.2d 329, 331 (9th Cir. 1975) (holding that parole board denied prisoner due
process by failing to provide adequate notice or opportunity to challenge increase in offense severity rating).
Nonetheless, the Judicial Conference, made up of the 12 circuit chief judges and 12 district court representa-
tives, works through its committees to recommend legislative reform. At least during my 12 years on the
Judicial Conference, the Conference never focused on or discussed the parole board's shortcomings.
17. For example, as Chief Judge I wrote to members of the House and Senate Judiciary Committees
on behalf of the council of the Eighth Circuit:
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ry voice of the judiciary, the Judicial Conference of the United States, remained
on the sidelines, watchful but silent.
During the early 1980's, when asked about the status of congressional
sentencing reform activities, the Chair of the Committee on Criminal Law and
At the July, 1980, meeting of the Judicial Conference of the Eighth Circuit, the judges of
the circuit engaged in extensive discussion of the sentencing provisions of S. 1722 and H.R.
6915, the pending Senate and House bills that would reform the federal criminal code. Several
aspects of the sentencing provisions have caused considerable concern among our district and
circuit judges. It is not practical in this letter, however, to get into detail about each of the
problem areas. They have been pointed out to the Senate and House Judiciary Committees, and
alternative provisions have been suggested, by judges who have testified at the several hearings
that have been held on the subject of criminal code reform. Now that the bills have passed
through the hearing stage and are ready for floor debate, we offer these observations, all of
which have been previously voiced to both Judiciary Committees:
(1) The sentencing provisions of the bills call for a substantial reallocation of the sentencing
function. Under the present state of the law, if a[n] offender is to be incarcerated, the amount
of time he will serve in prison will be determined by the prosecutor, who, by choosing the
statute under which the offender is to be charged, determines the maximum prison sentence that
can be imposed; the sentencing judge, who determines the maximum time to be served and sets
the earliest parole eligibility date; and the Parole Commission, which determines at what
moment, between the earliest statutory parole eligibility date and the maximum term set by the
sentencing judge, the offender is to be released. S. 1722 would abolish the Parole Commission
and, through the utilization of Sentencing Commission Guidelines, would substantially curtail
the sentencing options now available to the sentencing judge. Consequently, the discretion now
exercised by the Parole Commission and much of that now exercised by sentencing judges would
be transferred to the prosecutor.
The prosecutor already plays a considerable role in the decision as to how long an offender
may be incarcerated; the prosecutor selects a statute on which to base the charge and, thus,
establishes the maximum possible term of imprisonment, and through the plea bargaining
process, he may fashion the sentence actually handed down. Under S. 1722, the prosecutor,
having preindictment notice of the precise sentencing guidelines that would apply to the putative
defendant[,] would control the sentencing judge's exercise of the very narrow discretion allotted
him under the bill [and] could be confident of obtaining a particular sentence. He would simply
choose a charge that would produce the desired sentence. We question the wisdom of placing
that kind of discretion in the typical Assistant United States Attorney[,] whether or not his
exercise of that discretion is supervised personally by the United States Attorney.
(2) The perceived inequities in the treatment of those convicted of street crimes, as
compared with white collar offenses, will not, in our view, be corrected by either of the proposed
bills. Nor will there be any alleviation of the racial inequities thought to exist under present law.
Given the reallocation of the sentencing function so that its exercise rests principally with the
prosecutor and given criteria, especially under S. 1722, to be utilized in "categorizing" offenses
and offenders, we think the probabilities are that fewer white collar offenders and more of the
disadvantaged will go to prison.
Recently, the General Accounting Office made a study of prosecutorial disparity as it
relates to sentencing disparity and an in-depth study of the Parole Commission is now underway.
The results of this latest study[,] considered in the light of the earlier study and the problem
posed by the two criminal code revision bills, will no doubt warrant the consideration of new
alternatives in sentencing reform. With this in mind, the judges of the Eighth Circuit, by a vote
of 45-to-l, urged that passage of the sentencing provisions of S. 1722 and H.R. 6915 be deferred.
Letter from Donald P. Lay, Chief Judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, to
Senator Edward M. Kennedy, Chairman, Senate Judiciary Committee, and Representative Peter W. Rodino,
Jr., Chairman, House Judiciary Committee (Aug. 12, 1980) (on file with author).
The response I received from various Representatives and Senators can best be summarized by one
letter that noted that our views "are certainly entitled to great weight after all, it is the judges of this nation
who have 'lived with' the present code and would have to contend directly with whatever changes Congress
enacts." Letter from Senator Thomas F. Eagleton to Chief Judge Donald P. Lay (Aug. 29, 1980) (on file
with author).
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Probation Administration, Chief Judge Gerald Tjoflat, informed several of us
on the Conference that his committee was monitoring the situation and would
keep us informed. The next report to the Conference, however, announced that
the Senate had already passed the Sentencing Reform Act and that it was too
late for any recommendations for amendment. With all due respect to Chief
Justice Burger, I believe the Judicial Conference should have played a more
active role than merely monitoring congressional reform. The Criminal Law
Committee's principal contribution to the sentencing reform legislation was to
encourage Congress to include three members of the judiciary on the Sentenc-
ing Commission. Even that effort was not officially approved by the Judicial
Conference. Professor Freed charges that the guidelines were passed with little
consultative and deliberate process.18 The blame lies at the feet of a totally
apathetic judiciary.
Only after the federal sentencing guidelines became law in 1987 did the
federal judiciary begin to manifest real concern with the policy change. At that
time, the Judicial Conference formally requested that implementation of the
legislation be delayed pending further study. Congress declined, and the guide-
lines became law. While I am certain that the Judicial Conference in the early
1980's would have opposed the passage of the guidelines, whether the institu-
tional voice of the Conference would have caused a different outcome is
impossible to know. Given the opportunity, I am confident that the Conference
would have at least made recommendations to temper the guidelines' harsh
effects.19
Chief Judge Tjoflat, a respected colleague, has long endorsed the concept
of guideline sentencing. 20 He most recently made these views known in an
article for Federal Probation:
The sentencing guidelines grew out of the realization that sentenc-
ing according to the medical model of rehabilitation had failed. Prison
inmates complained that indeterminate sentences with uncertain release
dates constituted cruel punishment. Criminal justice practitioners and
criminologists declared imprisonment incapable of advancing rehabilita-
tive purposes. Even if imprisonment could rehabilitate, it had become
clear that it was impossible to ascertain whether a particular prisoner
had in fact been rehabilitated. Reports documented widely disparate
sentences for similar offenders convicted of similar offenses.
18. Freed, supra note 3, at 1690-91.
19. In those days, the majority of the chief circuit court judges were Johnson appointees from the
1960's who did not endorse the law and order concept we inherited from Nixon, Agnew, and Mitchell. The
guidelines, however, reflect the mortmain of the Nixon era.
20. Indeed, Chief Judge Tjoflat testified in favor of guideline sentencing before Congress. Federal
Sentencing Revision: Hearings on H.R. 2013, HR. 3128, HR. 4554, and H.R. 4827 Before the Subcomm.
on Criminal Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 25-48 (1984) (statement
of Gerald B. Tjoflat, chairman of the Committee on the Administration of the Probation System of the
Judicial Conference of the United States).
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In response to the mounting criticisms of a sentencing system that
vested wide discretion in the Parole Commission, Congress established
the Federal Sentencing Commission to establish uniform Federal
sentencing guidelines. The new guidelines were to assure, among other
things, that sentences are fair both to the offender and to society, and
that such fairness is reflected both in the individual case and in the
pattern of sentences in all Federal criminal cases, and that the offender,
the Federal personnel charged with implementing the sentence, and the
general public are certain about the sentence and the reasons for it.
21
Judge Tjoflat's article claims that the guidelines leave substantial room for
discretionary departure and blames defense counsel for not being sufficiently
innovative in suggesting areas of departure. With all due respect, I find Chief
Judge Tjoflat's argument illusory. The truth is that the manner in which the
Commission structured the guidelines leaves a sentencing judge little margin
of discretion to depart from them. Although Judge Tjoflat's views merit respect,
they are not shared by the vast majority of federal judges in this country. 2
This lack of support is not surprising. Notwithstanding laudable congressio-
nal goals, the guidelines continue to increase the number of men and women
incarcerated in our federal prisons, resulting in abhorrent social and economic
costs. The guidelines have generally resulted in longer sentences, prolonging
the dehumanization of incarceration. Moreover, as Chief Justice Rehnquist has
written, the guidelines have greatly increased the burden of the federal courts:
Before, the setting of the sentence within statutory limits was almost
entirely in the hands of the trial judge, and it was virtually impossible
to appeal against such a sentence. Now, elaborate guidelines are in
place, which detail exactly how the sentence in each case shall be
computed.... These new guidelines mean that a sentencing hearing
before a district judge, which might have taken five or ten minutes a
decade ago, could take an hour or more today. And the new statute
grants both the government and the defendant the right to appeal from
the sentence so fixed to the Court of Appeals-a right of which both
are taking full advantage. Criminal appeals rose 33 percent in the first
year of the Sentencing Guidelines. Overall, criminal appeals have more
than doubled in the past ten years. In 1991, 21 percent of the almost
10,000 appeals were of sentence only, and another 44 percent were
appeals of both sentence and conviction.'
21. Gerald B. Tjoflat, The Untapped Potential for Judicial Discretion Under the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines: Advice for Counsel, FED. PROBATION, Dec. 1991, at 4, 5 (citations omitted).
22. When the Federal Courts Study Committee held hearings on the guidelines, only four of the
approximately 270 people who testified supported the guidelines. See Michael Tonry, Judges and Sentencing
Policy-The American Experience, in SENTENCING, JUDICIAL TRAINING, AND DISCRETION (Martin Wasik
& Colin Munro eds., forthcoming 1992); see also Freed, supra note 3, at 1684-86, 1719-20.
23. Rehnquist, supra note 13, at 15-17.
17611992]
The Yale Law Journal
The guidelines have done nothing more than provide a negative contribution
to a serious societal problem. To paraphrase Justice Frankfurter: rigid rules,
although they may avoid some abuses, generate others.2 The passage of the
guidelines has done just that.
II. A STITCH IN TIME MIGHT SAVE SEVEN COMMISSIONERS
Professor Freed substantiates several salient concerns regarding the imple-
mentation of the guidelines. He finds that (1) the guidelines have become
unnecessarily rigid and imprisonment policies unduly severe; (2) courts of
appeals have contributed to the rigidity of that process by restricting the
authority of judges to depart from the guidelines in appropriate circumstanc-
es;z5 (3) the guidelines have undermined the idea of guided discretion by
providing mandatory penalties; and (4) the Commission has typically not
responded to proposals by individual judges and the Judicial Conference for
flexibility and moderation.
There is little evidence that the Commission will act on its own to make
the guidelines more flexible or imprisonment policies less severe. Although the
Commission may be an agency of the federal judiciary, it seems to lack super-
vision from any branch of government, and it reflects the Department of
Justice's severe sentencing philosophy. The drug hysteria that has swept across
the country has led recent Administrations to endorse the concept of longer
sentences and broader incarceration. The Commission members presently reflect
this attitude. As the Commission members display an increasingly defiant
24. See Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 498 (1953).
25. See Freed, supra note 3, at 1747 (appellate courts have "curtailled] the statutory duty to depart
as though it was a sin to venture outside the guideline range").
The judiciary's construction of policy statements as binding law serves as a paradigm for such critique.
The Commission exalts uniformity to obviate disparity, yet it allows departure for a defendant's "substantial
assistance," only when the prosecutor makes a motion for such a departure. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N,
FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINEs MANUAL § 5K 1. 1 (1992) [hereinafter U.S.S.G.]. Thus, the prosecutor's
unfettered, unchecked, and possibly arbitrary discretion is seldom placed on the table for review. This
practice results in less consistency in the sentencing process than when the sentencing judges evaluated
"substantial assistance" in all cases.
In United States v. Kelley, No. 90-1027, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 1445 (8th Cir. Feb. 5, 1992) (en
banc), the Eighth Circuit considered the Sentencing Commission's authority to prohibit courts from awarding
sentence departures for substantial assistance in the absence of a government motion. A six-to-five majority
held that policy statements such as § 5K1.1, which need not be submitted to Congress for approval, were
as binding on courts as the guidelines themselves. Writing for the majority, Judge John R. Gibson concluded
that "[n]othing could be more contrary to Congress' intent in providing for the Sentencing Guidelines than
to permit the courts to second-guess the Commission" because its approach "was simply not the best way
to handle the problem at hand." Id. at *23.
In dissent, Judge Heaney professed dismay at the majority's insistence on restricting the authority of
the district court:
The guidelines' enabling legislation does not require a motion, and Congress has not approved
the motion 'requirement' as part of a binding guideline.... We should recognize the motion
'requirement' for what it is: a procedural anomaly that the Sentencing Commission grafted onto
an advisory policy statement intended to provide guidance for the courts.
Id. at *42 (Heaney, J., dissenting).
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attitude toward judicial input, the courts of appeals and district courts may
begin to interpret the Commission's guidelines as inconsistent with congressio-
nal intent.
Professor Freed points out some of the more salient instances in which the
Commission has failed to maintain its legislative faith. For example, 28 U.S.C.
§ 994(e) requires the Commission to minimize the likelihood that the federal
prison population will exceed the capacity of federal prisons. Far from comply-
ing with this mandate, the Commission's policies have contributed in part to
an increase in the federal prison population from 42,000 in 1987 to a projected
72,000 in 199 2 . 6 This increase stems in part from the Commission's virtual
elimination of probation as an alternative sanction. The Commission's own
study predicted that, under the guidelines, the probation rate would fall from
approximately 42.4% to 18.9%.27 As Professor Freed observes, the "guidelines
containG a presumptive sentence of imprisonment for every felony in the
United States Code."'2 Furthermore, the Commission's mandatory relevant
conduct provisions, which prohibit courts from sentencing only on charged
offenses, have substantially increased the sentence range for all offenders. In
light of these policies and the resulting boom in the prison population, it is
difficult to perceive how the Commission has in good faith complied with
legislative intent.
The Eighth Circuit recently considered whether the Sentencing Commission
exceeded its statutory authority by mandating consideration of relevant conduct
that had never been the subject of a criminal trial.29 Writing for the majority
in United States v. Galloway, Judge Bright stated:
According to the [legislative history], subsection 991(b)(1)(B) under-
scores the major premise of the sentencing guidelines: the need to
avoid unwarranted sentencing disparity. Consistent with this objective,
the subsection establishes two factors as "the principle [sic] determi-
nants of whether two offenders' cases are so similar that a difference
between their sentences should be considered a disparity that should
be avoided unless it is warranted by other factors." Under the statute,
these factors are: (1) the prior records of offenders; and (2) the crimi-
nal conduct for which they have been found guilty.
The relevant conduct guideline promulgated by the Commission
strays far from this goal. The guideline requires increased penalties for
unconvicted conduct no matter how minor the offense of conviction
26. U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, supra note 7, at 112-17.
27. Id. at 113 (citing U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT ON THE INITIAL SENTENCING
GUIDELINES AND POLICY STATEMENTS 68 tbl.2 (1987)).
28. Freed, supra note 3, at 1706. The Commission's anti-probation policies also conflict with the
congressional goal of sparing first-time offenders imprisonment, as expressed in 28 U.S.C. § 994(j) (1988).
29. See United States v. Galloway, 943 F.2d 897 (8th Cir. 1991), vacated & reh'g en banc granted,
No. 90-3034EA, 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 27316 (8th Cir. Nov. 20, 1991). But see United States v. Miller,
910 F.2d 1321, 1326-28 (6th Cir. 1990) (uncharged conduct related to offense of conviction can be utilized
in determining base offense level under guidelines).
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may be in proportion to the unconvicted offenses at issue. This require-
ment has caused considerable and widespread concern in both sentenc-
ing and reviewing courts. Indeed, since its promulgation, courts have
repeatedly struggled with the tendency of the relevant conduct provi-
sions to dwarf the actual count of conviction.... [These compounded
sentences are not occasional aberrations, but predictable consequences
of the relevant conduct provisions now in effect. As such, these provi-
sions violate Congress' explicit instruction that the Commission, as its
primary task, seek to equalize sentences between defendants found
guilty of similar conduct.
Given the statutory provisions and legislative history, we now
conclude that the Commission exceeded its authority under the en-
abling legislation in drafting subsection 1B1.3(a)(2) of the relevant
conduct guideline to encompass the unconvicted criminal conduct at
issue in this case. We hold the provision unenforceable insofar as it
permits offenders to be systematically penalized for factually and
temporally distinct property crimes that have neither been charged by
indictment nor proven at trial.30
At this writing, however, the Eighth Circuit has vacated Judge Bright's opinion
in Galloway and the matter was heard en banc in January of this year.31
Far from the intended goal, the Commission's use of relevant conduct has
promoted greater disparity in sentences. The plea bargain, which traditionally
reduced relevant conduct severity factors, now breeds uncontrolled disparity.
As Professor Freed notes, the "the relevant conduct guideline reduces visibility
and candor in sentencing.' '32 At a recent sentencing institute for the Second
and Eighth Circuits, Professor Michael Tonry reported that due to the inherent
unfairness of the relevant conduct standard, no state considering sentencing
guidelines has adopted it as a basis for sentencing, implementing instead the
charged offense standard. Tonry further stated that based on his studies, no
other country has ever adopted relevant conduct as the applicable standard. 33
If relevant conduct is indeed the "cornerstone" of the federal guidelines, as
Chairman Wilkins has claimed,34 it is a weak and crumbling foundation in-
deed.
I do not think that we can look to Congress for any immediate changes in
the legislation that created the Commission. There is no question that by
enacting mandatory minimum sentences, Congress undermined the vision of
30. Galloway, 943 F.2d at 903-04 (citations and footnotes omitted); see also Miller, 910 F.2d at 1329-
30 (Merritt, C.L, dissenting) (arguing that relevant conduct guidelines promulgated by Commission exceed
scope of enabling legislation).
31. 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 27316 (8th Cir. Nov. 20, 1991).
32. Freed, supra note 3, at 1714.
33. Professor Michael Tonry, Remarks at the Sentencing Institute for of the Second and Eighth Circuits
(Mar. 4, 1992).
34. See William W. Wlkins, Jr. & John R. Steer, Relevant Conduct: The Cornerstone of the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines, 41 S.C. L. REv. 495 (1990).
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guided discretion embodied in the Sentencing Reform Act. 5 My lack of faith
in congressional reform is particularly profound in an election year, when
Congress will once again bend over backwards to avoid appearing "soft" on
crime. Recent attempts to pass legislation that would effectively bar habeas
corpus in federal courts illustrate the current mood.3
Although the Commission has thus far ignored proposals for flexibility and
moderation, it now appears to be considering amendments to the guidelines in
response to recommendations of the Judicial Conference.37 Some of these
amendments address the very concerns Professor Freed raises in his article.
For example, amendment 29 would give the district courts greater flexibility
to impose sentences other than imprisonment. 8 One of the recommended
options would expand the availability of probation and provide for split sentenc-
es.39 Amendment 35(C) requests comment on the issue of whether courts
should consider conduct for which a defendant has been acquitted in determin-
ing the offense level, or whether they should consider such conduct only in
determining where to sentence within a guideline range.'4 Amendment 35(A),
as suggested by the Judicial Conference, encourages the government to disclose
all guideline-relevant facts and circumstances to a defendant prior to the
entrance of a plea.41 This practice would inevitably introduce greater fairness
into the process and significantly reduce the number of appeals.
I hope that these new amendments will also provide greater flexibility for
the district courts to exercise discretion in making downward departures. For
example, amendment 33 would broaden the discretion of the sentencing judge
to depart downward or upward when certain offender characteristics are pres-
ent.!2 Amendment 26 would give the sentencing court more authority to con-
sider the nature rather than the number of prior offenses when considering
whether to depart from the guidelines.43
While I do not intend to address each of the proposed amendments, I note
approvingly that all of these amendments seek to provide the district courts with
greater latitude to give probation to offenders for whom the likelihood of
35. See Freed, supra note 3, at 1752.
36. Pending legislation in the Senate would bar any federal habeas proceeding if a "full and fair"
proceeding on the same claim existed in the state court. See, e.g., S. 2305, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. § 205
(1992). Although habeas corpus has nothing to do with crime prevention, it is viewed by some Senators
and by the Department of Justice as providing an unwarranted vehicle for criminals to challenge their
convictions. The possibility that these individuals might have been convicted by an unconstitutional process
or represented by incompetent counsel does not sway those politicians who seek only to present a certain
image to their constituents. The lay public tends not to appreciate such constitutional issues, and any effort
to provide criminals fundamental procedural rights is often misunderstood as being "soft" on crime.
37. See U.S. Sentencing Comm'n, Sentencing Guidelines and Policy Statements for Federal Courts:
Notice, 57 Fed. Reg. 90 (1992) (proposed Jan. 2, 1992).
38. Id. at 109-11.
39. Id. (second option).
40. Id. at 113.
41. Id. at 112-13.
42. Id. at 112.
43. Id. at 106-07.
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recidivism is low and to impose longer sentences on persons with very serious
criminal records. The difficulty with some of the proposed amendments is that
the Commission wants to achieve this commendable goal by creating additional
inflexible directives rather than by giving the district courts the discretion to
act in individual cases.
More specifically, the amendments do not adequately address the concept
of intermediate punishment. Professor Freed, like criminal justice scholars
Norval Morris and Michael Tonry, urges the adoption of intermediate pun-
ishments for persons who do not need to be placed in penitentiaries.45 Various
states are now beginning to recognize the ineffectiveness of past policies of
incarceration without accompanying rehabilitation efforts. Several states have
already recognized that intermediate punishments can save a great deal of
expense without sacrificing the necessary deterrent to crime." In fact, the most
successful strategy for persuading states to better employ alternatives for harsh
imprisonment, according to a friend of mine who was formerly the director of
a Southern prison system, is the Archie Bunker approach: never explain to
legislative officials how the plan will benefit prisoners by encouraging rehabili-
tation; simply point out that by using the proposed means of punishment the
taxpayers will save a great deal of money. In the long run, this may be the only
way politicians and the public will endorse attempts to improve our entire
system of penology.
CONCLUSION
Professor Freed's article should serve as a blueprint for reevaluating the
guidelines. The Federal Courts Study Commission and the ABA would greatly
benefit from studying Freed's article. While other outstanding studies have
contributed much to the debate,47 Freed's article offers the most useful com-
44. See NORVAL MORRIS & MICHAEL TONRY, BETWEEN PRISON AND PROBATION: INTERMEDIATE
PUNISHMENTS IN A RATIONAL SENTENCING SYSTEM (1990).
45. Freed, supra note 3, at 1707, 1751.
46. See, e.g., MORRIS & TONRY, supra note 44, at 65-68 (discussing Delaware's system of intermediate
punishments); id. at 180-86 (discussing programs of "intensive probation" in Georgia, New Jersey, and
Massachusetts); Governor Michael N. Castle, Address at the National Institute of Justice Conference on
Intermediate Punishments (Sept. 6, 1990), in Conference Focuses on Filling the Void Between Prison and
Probation, NAT'L INST. JUS. REPS., Nov.-Dec. 1990, at 2, 3 (discussing Delaware); ALA. R. CRIM. P. 26.8
("Judges should be sensitive to the impact their sentences have on all components of the criminal justice
system and should consider alternatives to long-term institutional confinement or incarceration in cases
involving offenders whom the court deems to pose no serious danger to society."); Lawrence A. Bennett,
Californians Support Community Punishment, AM. JAILS, Mar-Apr. 1991, at 44, 44-45 (indicating popular
support for intermediate punishments for less serious offenders).
47. See, e.g., Albert W. Alschuler, The Failure of Senterxing Guidelines: A Plea for Less Aggregation,
58 U. CHI. L. REV. 901 (1991); Gerald W. Heaney, The Reality of Guidelines Sentencing: No End to
Disparity, 28 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 161 (1991); Theresa W. Karle & Thomas Sager, Are the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines Meeting Congressional Goals? Empirical and Case Law Analysis, 40 EMORY L.J.
393 (1991); Bruce M. Selya & Matthew R. Kipp, An Examination of Emerging Departure Jurisprudence
Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 67 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1 (1991); Ronald F. Wright, Sentencers,
Bureaucrats, and the Administrative Law Perspective on the Federal Sentencing Commission, 79 CAL L.
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pendium of the guidelines' inherent problems. Legislative change is slow and
not always certain. Until radical reform occurs, "[tihe army that America is
marching into its prisons and jails" will continue to grow, and only the
Commission and the courts can provide real hope for change.
Yet, a conflict presently exists between the Commission and the judiciary.
This problem stems from the diffuse and amorphous body of judges speaking
in different voices. A striking number of judges have opposed the guidelines.
In fact, over 200 district judges held the SRA unconstitutional. 49 Some of the
Commissioners have reacted with indignation and responded with hostility
towards the entire judiciary, including the Judicial Conference. The Judicial
Conference cannot, of course, speak for each and every district and circuit
judge in the United States, but it does provide the appropriate forum for
structured judicial input into policy considerations. Congress, and more impor-
tantly the Commission, should heed the Conference's recommendations.
In March of this year, the Second and Eighth Circuits met under the
auspices of the Federal Judicial Center, a specialized body within the Judicial
Conference, at a Federal Sentencing Institute. The conference included panels
of judges, Commissioners, lawyers, and law professors. The panelists agreed
that, for the Sentencing Reform Act to serve the public good, a new spirit of
cooperation between federal judges and the Sentencing Commissioners must
emerge. It is on this basis that I conclude my commentary with an open letter
to the United States Sentencing Commission.
To The Commission:
This letter was written shortly after my attendance at the Sentencing
Institute for the Second and Eighth Circuits held in Lexington, Kentucky. To
arrange the conference, Second Circuit Chief Judge Jim Oakes and I, in my
capacity as the Chief Judge of the Eighth Circuit, appointed knowledgeable and
dedicated judges from both of our circuits to a planning committee. This
committee included Vimcent Broderick, district judge from the Southern District
of New York, Judge Jon Newman from the Second Circuit, Chief District Judge
Edward Filippine from St. Louis, and Judge Gerald Heaney of the Eighth
Circuit. The committee organized the Institute to evaluate the successes and
failures of the federal sentencing guidelines. In addition to federal judges and
members of the Commission, scholars such as Professors Dan Freed and
Michael Tonry, United States probation officers, and outstanding lawyers
attended. During the conference, a Commissioner complained that the Institute
REV. 1 (1991).
48. Alschuler, supra note 47, at 951.
49. U.S. SENTENc NG Comm'N, 1989 ANNuAL REPORT 11 (1989).
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should be confined to teaching judges how to apply the guidelines rather than
serving as a forum to allow judges and others to discuss weaknesses of the
guidelines. I mention this criticism because, in the eyes of many, it suggests
that the Commission considers itself immune from constructive criticism.
As the meeting progressed, many of the Commissioners expressed their
disdain for the views of certain members of the federal judiciary. One Commis-
sioner openly accused the judiciary of being arrogant. He claimed that Congress
took away the sentencing discretion of federal judges because they could not
be trusted in the sentencing process. At the same time, however, many judges
challenged the Commissioners' attitudes and criticisms of the federal judiciary.
It appears to many of us that the Commission is not interested in receiving
input from the federal bench. Similarly, many judges seem to have stopped
listening to the Commission. Inevitably, if these confrontational views continue,
the guidelines are doomed to utter failure.
While it is true that many judges seek outright repeal of the Sentencing
Reform Act, these same judges recognize the statute as a political reality
resulting from a studied analysis made by Congress, and they still desire to
improve the guideline sentencing system to benefit the public good. This can
only be achieved, however, by mutual cooperation between the judiciary and
the Commissioners. A polarized confrontation between the Commission and
the judiciary is not a productive solution. The Commission should realize that,
although many judges are not happy with the guidelines, they are not lawless
individuals, and they will apply the law to the best of their ability. At the same
time, the federal judiciary needs to realize that the responsibilities of the
Commission are difficult and time-consuming, and that while a perfect sentenc-
ing formula is perhaps unattainable, the Commission is striving for it in good
faith.
The Sentencing Reform Act was not designed to serve the Commission or
the judiciary, but the public good. The Act addresses the basic purpose of
criminal sentencing, the deterrence of crime, by directed measures affecting
both incapacitation of the offender and retribution for the crime committed. A
scheme to punish individuals with isolated incarceration is of little consequence,
however, if a harsh and rigid sentencing process fails to deter crime and results
in rising public costs. Yet, one Commissioner at the Institute announced that
the young age of an offender should not be regarded as a mitigating factor in
sentencing, since youths between the ages of eighteen and twenty-five rank
highest in recidivism. He reasoned that, by giving young persons long prison
terms, we cut down on recidivism. One member of the Department of Correc-
tions asked me: "Doesn't he know that after ten years in prison, a young person
returning to society is nonfunctional?"
My chief concern is that the Commission's disregard of the judiciary's
opinions overlooks the fact that, under the SRA, federal district judges must
still provide individualized sentencing. Congress did not intend sentencing to
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be, as some misguided judges now view it, a mechanical process? ° The
district judge, not the Commission, is still the key figure in the sentencing
process, and if the judge loses confidence in that process, the entire system is
doomed to chaos. If the Commission believes that the SRA sought to deny
judges individualized sentencing authority, it is wrong. The guidelines were not
intended "to eliminate the thoughtful imposition of individualized sentenc-
ing.",51
At the Institute, several Commissioners expressed the belief that a uniform
sentencing system cannot incorporate extensive departure provisions. I submit
that this position misreads congressional history. The notion that flexibility
cannot coexist with disparity fails to recognize the gross disparities that have
resulted under the severe, rigid sentencing structure of the present guidelines.
Guideline sentencing must deal with the diversity of human nature. If the
Commission continues to maintain that allowing the guidelines to consider
individual differences among offenders will foster unwarranted disparity, it will
only widen the breach between the Commission and the judiciary. Such a view
not only contradicts congressional intent, it denies the empirical knowledge of
federal district judges who confront diversity daily in the sentencing process.
Judges must be given as much flexibility as possible to carry out sentencing
policies. If both the Commission and the judiciary heed Professor Freed's
objective analysis, perhaps the future will be brighter.
Apparently, the Commission's philosophy of criminal sentencing is to shape
the sentence to the crime, rather than to the offender. This policy directly
contradicts Congress' desire to maintain individualized sentencing. I believe
that some day we will reinstitute the policy that a sentence should attempt to
rehabilitate an offender as well as prescribe his punishment.52 The guidelines'
myopic focus on the period of incarceration has created a sentencing system
that not only totally ignores the human degradation that can occur through long
and unjust mechanical sentences, but also is bound to fail.
Although many Commissioners are convinced that they are carrying out
the intent of Congress, I hope that you will heed the discourse provided at the
Institute, demonstrating that most harsh and rigid guidelines lack congressional
50. S. REP. No. 225, supra note 5, at 52, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3235 (guidelines should
not be imposed in "mechanistic fashion").
51. Id.
52.
By eliminating rehabilitation as an imprisonment goal, Congress has determined that incarceration
is an inappropriate way to "cure" a convict of his or her criminal tendencies. Prisons, however,
have their costs, not only for the maintenance and housing of inmates, but also in the toll they
take on the lives of those incarcerated. Prisoners lose their jobs and may lose family and
community support; those who are exposed to prison brutality no doubt lose a great deal more.
To the extent that these circumstances isolate an inmate and deprive him or her of healthy
economic or social opportunities upon release, the probability of a return to criminal activities
increases. Rehabilitation is directed to reducing that probability.
Karle & Sager, supra note 47, at 440.
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mandate. Rather, as Professor Tonry pointed out in his remarks, much of the
rigidity results from choices made by the Commission.
53
For example, the Commission, by defining many offenses that tradition-
ally received probation as "serious," 54 has distorted the statutory presump-
tion against incarceration for first offenders not convicted of a crime of
violence or an otherwise "serious" offense.55 The Commission has also
established, as a matter of choice, that the section 5Kl.I policy statement,
allowing departures for substantial assistance, becomes effective only upon
the motion of the prosecutor.
The use of the relevant conduct standard was also solely the choice of
the Commission. As Professor Tonry reported, this standard has been reject-
ed by all state sentencing commissions and every foreign country that has
considered it.56 Another non-statutory choice of the Commission involves
the complicated forty-three-level grid. Most states have established grids with
six to twelve levels.57 The more complicated and mechanical the process
becomes, the more foreseeable it is that human error and gross disparity in
sentencing will result. Thus, it is difficult to perceive the need or desire for
such a complex process.
The Commission also chose not to devise guidelines for fines or other
nonincarceration sentences, except in a few minor cases and for organization-
al offenders. Lacking congressional mandate, it is difficult to understand why
the Commission has not considered intermediate alternatives between prison
and probation.
There are many other areas of misdirected Commission choices, such
as the incorporation of mandatory minimum sentences within the guidelines,
that are not congressionally mandated. I believe that all these choices high-
light the need for greater discourse and cooperation with the judges who
must carry out the process. Moreover, many learned and interested persons
remain satisfied that a choice exists between outright repeal of the guidelines
and living with them as they now exist.
In conclusion, let me say that it is my sincere wish that further polariza-
tion between the Commission and the judiciary come to an abrupt halt. In
its place I hope that mutual studied discourse between the two groups can,
53. See Tonry, supra note 33.
54. See U.S.S.G., supra note 25, ch. 1, pt. A, intro. 4(d).
55. See 28 U.S.C. § 994G) (1988).
56. Tory, supra note 33.
57. See, e.g., MINNESOTA SENTENCING COMM'N, MINNESOTA SENTENCING GUIDELINES, reprinted in
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 244 app. at 413 (West Supp. 1992) (10 levels).
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in the public interest, lead to guidelines more humane and acceptable to all
parties concerned.

